http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/site/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/64346/index.do 
Hrushka v. The Queen[1] (October 24, 2013) dealt with a father’s claim to child tax benefit and the goods and services tax credit in respect of his daughter. He claimed that since he was a student he had more flexibility to be the primary care giver to his daughter as his former wife had a full time job. The court did not accept his arguments:
[21] Based on the totality of the evidence, I have concluded that Ms. Kuncewicz primarily fulfilled the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the child during the Period.
[22] I would first note that clause (h) of the relevant regulation requires that the court order be taken into account. The order provides that the primary residence of the child is with Ms. Kuncewicz. In terms of access by the father, the order provides that the access should be generous, but the time allotted is less than the time the child spends with Ms. Kuncewicz. According to the evidence, the court order has been followed. This is very strong evidence that Ms. Kuncewicz primarily fulfills the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the child.
[23] However, the evidence also reveals that Ms. Kuncewicz has fixed hours of work and Mr. Hrushka has flexibility with his schedule as a student. In light of this, Mr. Hrushka is sometimes more available during the day to care for the child if the child has to leave the daycare for medical or other reasons. Based on the evidence as a whole, I do not think these occasions are frequent enough to tip the scales so that Mr. Hrushka can be said to primarily fulfill the care and upbringing role.
[24] Mr. Hrushka testified that, after the Period, he was very active in dealing with a problem at the child’s school and Ms. Kuncewicz did not get involved. Based on the evidence of both parents, I would conclude that such incidents do not establish that Ms. Kuncewicz did not assume primary responsibility for the care of the child. Rather, the circumstances are more indicative of a difference in parenting style.
[25] The evidence as a whole suggests that both Mr. Hrushka and Ms. Kuncewicz are dedicated parents who are committed to the care and upbringing of the child. It appears that Mr. Hrushka and Ms. Kuncewicz have different parenting styles, but this should not be a factor in deciding who should be entitled to the benefits at issue.
The court also rejected his argument based on the “shared-custody” rule:
[26] As a result of an amendment to the definition of “eligible individual” effective July 2011, if parents are shared-custody parents, as defined, the benefits are to be shared between them.
[27] The term “shared-custody parent” is defined in s. 122.6 of the Act, which reads:
“shared-custody parent” in respect of a qualified dependent at a particular time means, where the presumption referred to in paragraph (f) of the definition “eligible individual” does not apply in respect of the qualified dependant, an individual who is one of the two parents of the qualified dependant who
(a) are not at that time cohabitating spouses or common-law partners of each other,
(b) reside with the qualified dependant on an equal or near equal basis, and
(c) primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant when residing with the qualified dependant, as determined in consideration of prescribed factors.
[28] Based on the definition above, and the evidence before me, it is clear in this case that Mr. Hrushka is not a shared-custody parent because he did not reside with the child on an equal or near equal basis. The child spends most of her time at the residence of her mother, except for weekends, which are divided equally. This does not satisfy the near equal residence requirement.
[1] 2013 TCC 335.